MIGRATION LAW


KNOWING THE LAW:                                                                                   

This page is aimed to outline some core issues in academia of migration act. The act has a history of formation in political practice, but that is past. It is ongoing development process, labelled as public interest to sail the acceptable destinations of the act.

Natural justice [article1, article2, article3] and procedural fairness are core terms for this act, as because the act is practised in different levels of commonwealth administration. I would say two sides of same coin. Some people say natural justice is simply a mandatory procedural fairness. The term miscarriage of justice also correlated with the idea. 

The act has vast and intensive procedural guidelines to administer, those are also practicable jurisdictions of each authority. Anyone seeking any remedy from this act is protected by a common law practice called natural justice. This common law rule encompasses fair and legitimate expectation of applicants because the provision affirms "as far as reasonably practicable." On other page of this site, some law journals discuss about these terms mostly from the aid of court judgements or case laws. As a result I prefer gathering some bench mark case laws to furnish this page.

PROVISION RELATED TO ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
[JURISDICTIONAL ERROR]:  





READ:

In a case of jurisdictional error [purported privative cause decision] done by delegate of minister, case should go to either High Court or Federal circuit court under original jurisdiction. High court has power to transfer a matter to circuit court as they hold same jurisdiction under migration act.  

HOW SHOULD COURTS CONSTRUE PRIVATIVE CLAUSES? Katherine Reimers. AIAL FORUM No. 56.

The Nature of Judicial Review of Migration Decisions Hearsay ... the electronic journal of the Bar Association of Queensland Issue 80: Sept 2017.

"migration decision" means:
                     (a)  a privative clause decision; or

                     (b)  a purported privative clause decision; or

                     (c)  a non-privative clause decision; or


                     (d)  an AAT Act migration decision.



PROVISION RELATED TO APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
[ERROR OR QUESTION OF LAW]:  





Decision of delegate of minister can be reviewed with new evidences by AAT on grounds of error of law made under migration act. It must filed in 28 days, no guidelines for extension of time only can be granted if applicant did not get the decision of delegate on time for strong reasoning and evidence.

Decision of member from AAT can be review on ground of question of law with new evidence in the federal court. Federal court has power to transfer the proceeding to circuit court. An appeal from AAT usually considered as original jurisdiction of the circuit court.

[Case law: Adding New ground in appeal, fraud by third party:  Maharjan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 213. read only : Abbasi (rule 43; para 322(5): accountants' evidence); [2020] UKUT 27] 




EXAMPLE PROVISIONS:                                                                                    

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT
s51, s61, s71, s75(v).
Australian Human rights commission Act 1986
Shedule-1-Article-2, Shedule-2-Article-26
AAT act 1975
s2A, ss25(1)(4A), s24Z,
Migration Act 1958
s3A, s4, ss5(1), s5E, ss47(1), ss48(3)(4), ss49(1)(2)(3), s51A, s54, ss55(1), s56, s57, s58, ss65(1) (a), ss69(1), part-2-Div3-SubDiv-AB, s104, s352, s474, s475, s476, s477, s353, 357A, s359, s336M, ss349(1), s347,
Migration regulation 1994
reg 5.19, reg 1.13A, Sch2-186.1, 186.2, 186.21, 186.23, Sch1- 1114B
FAIR WORK ACT
s12, ss336(c)(d), ss351(1), ss354(1)(a)(ii),


PERSPECTIVE OF LAW: Law of Fraud or mistake                                

 It is necessary to know that under ss75(v) of constitution fraud and jurisdictional errors both are dealt by the court.
  
(SZFDE) v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; At [8];
[Case: applicant defrauded by migration agent]; “It is convenient first to consider the place of "fraud" in the framework of general legal principle. In his celebrated speech in Reddaway v Banham, Lord Macnaghten spoke of the various guises in which fraud appears in the conduct of human affairs, saying "fraud is infinite in variety". A corollary, expressed by Kerr in his "Treatise on the Law of Fraud and Mistake", is that: "The fertility of man's invention in devising new schemes of fraud is so great, that the courts have always declined to define it ... reserving to themselves the liberty to deal with it under whatever form it may present itself."
Taylor v Taylor [1979] HCA 38; Stevens v Guppy [1823] EngR 520; DL v The Queen [2018] HCATrans 83; discussed in: DJL v Central Authority [2000] HCA 17; 
(Flower) v Lloyd CA [1877] 6 ChD 297. [Case: concealment of part of the process]; “There always was a power, and there still is a power, in the Courts of Law in this country to give adequate relief.”
PERSPECTIVE OF LAW: JUDICIAL POWER                                                  

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 51; Legislative powers of the Parliament [see Notes 10 and 11]; The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
ASIC v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) HCA 1;204; at [12]
The significance of the decision in Re Wakim appears from the following statement [13]: "Australia is a federation of a dualist kind, consistently with the common law tradition. While some provisions in the Constitution provide for cooperation, they do not fundamentally alter its dualist character; indeed, if anything, they reinforce it. The nature of the Australian constitutional system needs to be borne in mind in designing cooperative procedures. The issues at stake essentially are questions of principle."
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 61; Executive power; The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.
(Taylor) v Lawrence   [2002] 2 All ER 353

(DJL) v Central Authority [2000] HCA 17; [intrinsic power of statutory court]
“The Court of Appeal adopted the approach of Lord Diplock in Bremer Vulcan Schiffbauund Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corp “that any court must have inherent power to do what is necessary “in order to maintain its character as a court of justice”, and that public confidence in the administration of justice made it necessary to reopen a case where significant injustice would otherwise result.
Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; At [10] per GAUDRON J.
The nature and purpose of the inherent power of a Court was explained in Cocker v. Tempest [1841] EngR 242; (1841) 7 M & W 502, at pp 503504 [1841] EngR 242; (151 ER 864, at p 865) by Alderson B. in these terms: "The power of each Court over its own process is unlimited; it is a power incident to all Courts, inferior as well as superior; were it not so, the Court would be obliged to sit still and see its own process abused for the purpose of injustice.... The power must be used equitably; but if it be made out that the process of the Court is used against good faith, the Court ought to interfere to prevent it, for the purpose of administering justice."
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT - SECT 71; Judicial power and Courts; The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other Justices, not less than two, as the Parliament prescribes.
WHAT IS JUDICIAL POWER? Authority, both constitutional and legal, given to the courts and its judges (1) to preside over and render judgment on court-worthy cases; (2) to enforce or void statutes and laws when scope or constitutionality are questioned (3) to interpret statutes and laws when disputes arise.
(Nicholas) v R [1998] HCA 9; At [14] The nature of judicial power and the essential character of the courts which are charged with its exercise can be ascertained in part from the Constitution, in part from the common law. The common law informs the institutions of government. Parliament, the Executive and the Judicature in which the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the Commonwealth are reposed respectively by ss 1, 61 and 71 of the Constitution. At [15] The judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested in a court when the Constitution or a law of the Commonwealth confers jurisdiction to exercise judicial power in specified matters. Having heard and determined a matter in which it has jurisdiction, the court exercises the judicial power of the Commonwealth by the making of its judgement or order. Subject to the Constitution, the Parliament can prescribe the jurisdiction to be conferred on a court but it cannot direct the court as to the judgement or order which it might make in exercise of a jurisdiction conferred upon it. At [17] Judicial power, though never exhaustively defined, was described in a familiar passage in the judgment of Griffith CJ in Huddart, Parker & Co Proprietary Ltd vMoorehead [21]: "[T]he words 'judicial power' as used in sec 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action."
R v (Trade Practices Tribunal); Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd [1970] HCA 8; at [2,7,12.14]
The obvious corollary is that it is not ‘possible to conclude that the determination constitutes an exercise of judicial power’, if there is no ‘objective standard or test prescribed by the legislature’ to be applied....“They must perform their tasks in a judicial manner, and in accordance with the dictates of natural justice so far as the circumstances allow”....“ . . . we do not think that the word 'matter' in s. 76 means a legal proceeding, but rather the subject matter for determination in a legal proceeding.”...."All these opinions indicate that a matter under the judicature provisions of the Constitution must involve some right or privilege or protection given by law, or the prevention, redress or punishment of some act inhibited by law."


PERSPECTIVE OF LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT                             

"Jurisdictional error" and "constructive failure" by delegate or member of tribunal attracts the original jurisdiction of the court [delegate to High Court or Circuit Court, Member to High court or federal court]. Error of law and Jurisdictional error both are different concepts but has similarities. In most cases when error of law is proved to overturn a decision it is not necessary to show Jurisdictional error. From assertions it is transparent that every authority has some authorities to practice power and discretions. Some errors occur within the limit of the power or authority given by statute and some exceeds the authority. Jurisdictional error is all about construction of statute, interpretation of the statue from the perspective of "totality of the act" to identify either excess of jurisdiction [purported exercise of jurisdiction] or a failure [constructive] to practice a jurisdiction related to core statutory provisions. Jurisdictional error extends up to "application of migration regulation in flexible terms". This idea mostly determined by the breach of "rule of natural justice" or breach of "procedural fairness". In other hand there could be no "bona fide attempt" to practice an existing jurisdiction or the decision could "manifestly unreasonable" or manifestly wrong. Similarly relevant consideration of the facts in application of a statute is ignored there could be constructive failure or fundamental mistake. Following cases are useful to understand the concept those were re-explained in the following table with other relevant considerations. 

(Craig) v South Australia,[1995] HCA 58; at [7-13]; Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission; Kirk Group Holdings Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Childs) [2010] HCA 1; at [60-70] [case: compensation claim against employer was established upon wrong issue]; R v Hickman [1945] HCA 53; (Plaintiff S157)_2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2 at [1, 8, 13, 15, 16, 19, 26] [98] [152, 158, 159, 160] [168, 171,176,178].  

Jurisdictional error can encompass an application that was withdrawn as per direction of the delegate. It might be the case decision maker induced or suborned or intimidate the applicant to withdraw his application will make the withdrawal invalid. It could be purported direction in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise court will declare the disposal of application by way of direction as invalid. Rule of natural justice is designed to allow an applicant to present his case not to induce withdrawal. If there is a written direction excess of jurisdiction that will necessarily proof existence of duress. In these cases court may overturn a decision if it was effected by other jurisdictional errors.

disposal - rule of natural justice and procedurAL FaIRNESS: (PLAINTIFF S61/2016) v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION (S61/2016); Armour v FAC [2012] QMC 22; to address intimidation or subornation; TAYLOR v. TAYLOR [1979] HCA 38 per GIBBS J. at [4, 5, 8] to address breach of natural justice and procedural fairness; so-called "ouster clause": Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1968] UKHL 6; Birch, Carroll & Coyle Ltd v. Mulgrave Shire Council (1980) 6 Q L 286 (Q Local Gov Ct); Queens-land appeal tribunal has held that it could not be deprived of jurisdiction even by withdrawal of application to which the decision under appeal relates; AB vTabcorp Holdings [2015] FWCFB 523; at [11]; “We agree with the proposition that in certain circumstances a notice of discontinuance can, in effect, be set aside if it was filed by mistake or under duress. However we doubt that such a power may be exercised by the Commission. It seems to us that any such application would have to be made to a court - for a declaration that the notice was a nullity. As an arbitral body the Commission cannot grant declaratory relief.      


Case Law
Relevance
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v (SZSSJ); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTZI [2016] HCA 29 at [2, 58-73]
Original jurisdiction of circuit court. Conduct preparatory in the s474, s5E of migration act.
R v Hickman [1945] HCA 53; (1945); Dixon J, which provide that a privative clause will only cure jurisdictional error if the decision:
1. is a bona fide attempt to exercise the power
2. relates to the subject matter of the legislation, and
3. is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the body.
The first condition is thought to require a decision maker to act in good faith. If they act out of ‘malice, spite, dishonesty, or some other improper motivation’, then the decision will not be protected by a privative clause. The second and third constraints are thought to be virtually the same, though there is no clear High Court direction about what they amount to. Generally, the second constraint is thought to mean that a privative clause will not protect a decision if the decision-maker strays from the subject matter of the legislation under which the decision is being made. The third constraint seems to mean that the decision must not, on its face, exceed the authority of the decision-maker. For example, if a public servant does not have the relevant delegation to make a decision, it will not be saved. In later years, an additional condition appears to have been added, so that a decision may not be protected if a decision maker fails to discharge ‘imperative duties’ or goes beyond ‘inviolable limitations or restraints’. This is explained as ‘not breach[ing] a statutory constraint regarded as being so important as to be unprotected in any way by the operation of the [privative] clause’. [Source: HOW SHOULD COURTS CONSTRUE PRIVATIVE CLAUSES? Katherine Reimers. AIAL FORUM No. 56]
(PLAINTIFF S61/2016) v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION (S61/2016)
 High court, On 13 September 2016 (after the writing of these short particulars) the Direction was revoked and replaced with another written direction made by the Minister under s 499 of the Migration Act.
[Case: Revoking delegate’s invalid direction]
LEGAL PRINCIPLE : CONSTRUCTIVE FAILURE
(Coal and Allied) v AIRC [2000] HCA 47 at [82-84]; It is a pretended or assumed discharge. But in the eye of the law, the powers and functions have never been lawfully performed..... Misapprehension on the part of the decision-maker of the nature of the powers and functions which the decision-maker is called upon to exercise or of the essential conditions by reference to which that exercise must occur…"an error of law may amount to a jurisdictional error even though the [decision-maker that] made the error had jurisdiction to embark on its inquiry"………..to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. [Case: Suspension and termination of bargaining period, constitutionality of appeal]
Ex parte Hebburn Ltd; Re (Kearsley Shire Council) SR (NSW)  (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 416 at 420; But there are mistakes and mistakes; and if a mistake of law as to the proper construction of a statute investing a tribunal with jurisdiction leads it to misunderstand the nature of the jurisdiction which it is to exercise, and to apply " a wrong and inadmissible test": Estate and Trust Agencies (1927) Ltd. v. Singapore Improvement Trust (2); or to " misconceive its duty," or " not to apply itself to the question which the law prescribes"; The King v. War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal. [case: Council claimed extra rate in misunderstanding of provision or constructive unpractised]
(Plaintiff S157)_2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2 at [1, 8, 13, 15, 16, 19, 26] [98] [152, 158, 159, 160] [168, 171,176,178]; Whether their determination, when made, would be void.....Board exceeded its lawful authority could not be taken away by statute... a purported decision is not a "decision ... under this Act" so as to attract the protection given by s 474.. true construction of the Act as a whole…manifest defect...want of jurisdiction... bona fide attempt to exercise the relevant power.... essential or imperative requirement on the part of the relevant officer or tribunal, or a material failure to comply with what might once have conventionally been described as a mandatory provision.... [Case: tribunal breached mandetory rule of natural justice or core provision]
FLEXIBILITY IN THE OPERATION OF THE LEGISLATION
(Jackson) v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 203 at [17][19][23]
Constitutional right. S75(v). Inflexible application of policy. “These matters must be addressed by reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the application as well as the circumstances existing at the time of the decision.” Case: [special need relative circumstances at time of determination and time of application]
(Waensila) v Minister for immigration and border protection [2016] FCAFC 32 at [catchwords]; per DOWSETT J: at[2]
Compelling and compassionate reasons. the power is designed to provide flexibility in the operation of the legislative and regulatory scheme.
(Prassad) v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 560
in my opinion, is that a person who is seeking an employment visa under sections 3B et seq of the Immigration Regulations, Part I, and who requests that his case be submitted to the Minister so that the latter may exercise the power conferred on him by section 3G(d) of the Regulations, may not be deported on the ground that he has no employment visa until the matter has been put before the Minister.
A FAILURE TO CONSIDER AN APPLICANT’S CLAIMS AS MADE:
(Dranichnikov) v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26 at GLEESON CJ. [18][81][82][87] [29] HAYNE J. at [95]
Jurisdictional error, Constructive failure. Failure to accord natural justice. Fundamental mistake.
WEDNESBURY UNREASONABLENESS:
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v (Li) [2013] HCA 18 At [4] Per French CJ.
CASE: [Tribunal did not allow time for pending skill assessment]
A FAILURE TO FOLLOW MANDATORY PROCEDURES:
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte (Miah) [2001] HCA 22 at [80, 106, 126, 128,146, 147, 150]
Legal principles: S75(v) constitutional right in context of mandamuses to delegate of minister.  Constructive Failure to exercise jurisdiction, failed to comply with requirements of procedural fairness.
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte (Aala) [2000] HCA 57 at catchwords, [15-16], [37-40], [43], [141], [164], [212], [216] .
Legal principles: S75(v) in case of natural justice and procedural fairness. Whether prosecutor denied possibility of a successful outcome. Whether prohibition available as of right or by discretion – Whether application should be rejected due to delay.
(SAAP) v Minister for Immigration (2005) 228 CLR 294, per GLEESON CJ. at [8, 11,13, 14, 15, 16]
Per McHUGH J. [25, 44, 50, 55,72]
While it is true that fairness in administrative decision making is not measured by reference to a judicial paradigm, judicial procedure ought to be an example of fairness in action…Inviolable procedural Requirement… circumstances that existed at the hearing… "imperative duties"..
Case: [Tribunal made decision against daughter’s testimony in absence and without farther comment from applicant]
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v (SZQRB) (includes Corrigendum dated 22 March 2013) [2013] FCAFC 33 at [390-391]
Not giving regards to submission is breach of procedural fairness in   most fundamental way. Constitutional writ in a case of non compellable provisions.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v (Yusuf)  [2001] HCA 30 [3][13][16][17]
s75(v)-Procedural fairness in decision paper, material fact , alternative basis, improper exercise of the power. Bad faith. 
(Kioa) v West [1985] 159 CLR 550 per MASON J; at [29][30][31] per DEANE J. at [8]
Rights, interests, legitimate expectations, effects to an individual direct and immediate way, contrary statutory intent, if applicant affords to have natural justice? “Common law duty to act fairly “
(SZVCP) v Minister for immigration and border protection [2016] FCAFC 24 at [Catchwords]
Human rights, fairness.

PERSPECTIVE OF LAW: S416 V. S48B OF MIGRATION ACT

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs & Anor v (Mohinder Singh) [1997] FCA 17
Decision must be considered based on the circumstance at the time of decision.
Shantha Karunaratna (Jayasinghe) v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs & Anor [1997] FCA 551
Functus officio vs. finality
(SZBWJ) & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2008] FMCA 164.

(SZASP) v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 771
Change in circumstance [in receiving country or other] is not valid reason under s416 MA.
at [17] “The section applies in circumstances where there is a valid application before the Tribunal and enables the Tribunal not to consider claims that were earlier considered by the Tribunal, where an application is made to the Tribunal for review of a delegate's decision not previously the subject of review by the Tribunal.”
                             TRIBUNALS WAY OF PROCEEDING


Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v (Rajalingam) [1999] FCA 719 at [140]
"Tribunal is required to do no more than to satisfy itself in accordance with commonsense and the ordinary experience of mankind."
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v (Li) [2013] HCA 18 at [14] per FRENCH CJ.
(General Merchandise) and Apparel Group P_L and CEO of Customs and Australian Weaving Mills (Party Joined) [2009] AATA 988, at [135]
Rule of Evidence for tribunal.
“In the exercise of function of its review, power and discretion...criterion of lawfulness, fairness and rationality...”
“That restriction is that the material must be relevant to, or logically probative” 


REFERENCE TO LAW JOURNALS:

HOW SHOULD COURTS CONSTRUE
PRIVATIVE CLAUSES? Katherine Reimers. AIAL FORUM No. 56
The Nature of Judicial Review of Migration Decisions
Hearsay ... the electronic journal of the Bar Association of Queensland
Issue 80: Sept 2017
Beaton-Wells, Caron --- "Judicial Review of Migration Decisions: Life After S157" [2005] FedLawRw 5; (2005) 33(1) Federal Law Review 141
Plaintiff S157v The Commonwealth: A Vindication of Judicial Review of Administrative Action by ALEXANDER SKINNER
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 20
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ‘TRADITIONAL’ ADMINISTRATION AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION GEOFF AIRO-FARULLA AND STEVEN WHITE∗ Macquarie Law Journal (2004) Vol 4


ERSPECTIVE OF LAW: EXTENSION OF TIME                                   
(Hunter Valley Developments) v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at [348-349]
 Prospect of success = miscarriage of justice. This case is helpful to file appeal to a court when time for filing appeal is over.
(Craig) v South Australia,[1995] HCA 58, (1995) 184 CLR 163 (24th October 1995) At [8]
 Catchwords: Legal representation, procedural fairness. Inherent power. This case gives insigt about the fact that litigant in person gets extention of time to arrange legal representation.
(TAYLOR) v. TAYLOR [1979] HCA 38 per GIBBS
J. at [4, 5, 8]
 Reasonable opportunities, deeprooted principle, must be afforded an adequate opportunity of being heard, Inherent power.
(Fernando) v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 324 at [22] PER HEEREY J:
Migration act does not allow extension of time when filing review to tribunal, When time is over only way to challenge the the decision of delegate is taking it to high court or circuit court under ss75(v) of constitution. It appears in the s476 of migration act that when time is over it no longer considered as primary decision. Only if the above case applies when applicant was not have the decision without any fault from his side, will consider as serious breach of procedural fairness to grant extension of time.  
(Plaintiff S157)_2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2 at  [168, 171,176,178]
Extension of time is not a barrier in a case of constitutional writ. 

      PERSPECTIVE OF LAW: ERRORS OF LAW:     
   
please read error of law page.


PERSPECTIVE OF LAW: EMPLOYMENT LAW AND EXPLOITATION OF MIGRANT WORKER
-A report on the Fair Work Ombudsman’s Inquiry into the labour procurement arrangements of the Baiada Group in New South Wales. Date of publication - June 2015
This is a case DIBP helped all 457 visa applicant to recover from employment fraud or underpayment.
-[Oct 2015 7 Eleven employment scandal and consequence of resignation of two CEOs] DIBP supported all students who were exploited and everyone got back payment of their underpayment even though some of them left the country.
[FWA v Thomson (no 4) [2015] FCA 1433 where former minster Craig Thomson paid underpayment amount with interest up to judgment]
Fair work Ombudsman v Life style SA pty ltd 31th oct 2014 FCA 1151],

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